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Introduction
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently rendered
two decisions which represent a compromise between increasing the
power of the judge and maintaining a role for the jury. The first,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., increased the power of the
judge in patent infringement cases.' The second, Hilton Davis Chemi-
cal Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., maintained or increased the jury's
role in those same cases.2 This Note, with reference to studies in juror
comprehension and improved trial techniques, will explore whether
the courts struck an appropriate balance.
Part I provides a brief introduction to patent infringement law.
Part II summarizes Markman. Part III summarizes Hilton Davis. Part
IV evaluates whether Markman or Hilton Davis represents the proper
choice between allowing the judge or jury to decide patent infringe-
ment issues. The author concludes that the court in Markman went
too far when it took claims construction issues from jurors.
I
Introduction to Patent Infringement
Patent law protects inventions which are new, useful, and non-
obvious to practitioners in the technological field3 in which the inven-
tion was developed.4 Patent law protects inventions ranging from
mechanical devices to mathematical algorithms.5 An invention may
receive protection if it: (1) fits into the utility,6 design,7 or plant" pat-
ent categories; (2) has a useful purpose; (3) is novel in comparison to
the prior art; and (4) is not obvious from the prior art to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.9 When an
invention receives patent protection, the inventor is granted the right
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention
in the United States "for a term beginning on the date on which the
1. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995).
2. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
3. In patent terms this is expressed as "not obvious from the prior art to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made." DONALD S. CHISUM, UNDER-
STANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-18 (1992). Thus, prior art refers to knowledge
in the field of the developed invention.
4. Id. at 2-8.
5. Id.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).
9. CHiSUM, supra note 3, at 2-18.
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patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the applica-
tion for the patent was filed in the United States."'"
If another party makes, uses, or sells an invention which infringes
a patent, the inventor may bring a suit in federal district court for
patent infringement.'" To determine whether a party has infringed,
the language of the patent claim12 must first be construed to deter-
mine the scope of the patent.' 3 Once the scope is defined, it must be
determined if the accused product or process infringes on the patent.'
4
The accused product or process can infringe in two ways. First, it
can literally infringe on the patent holder's patent. To literally in-
fringe, an accused product or process must contain every element of
the patent holder's claim.'5 Second, a patent or process can infringe
under the doctrine of equivalents.' 6 The doctrine of equivalents pro-
vides broader protection for patent holders than literal infringement.
17
Under the doctrine of equivalents, an accused product or process in-
fringes when it performs "substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to obtain the same result as the claimed
invention."' 8 This is frequently referred to as the "function/way/
means" test.19
An alleged infringer may raise several defenses: invalidity, unen-
forceability, laches, misuse, or experimental use.2" The patent
holder's remedies include: preliminary and permanent injunctions,
damages, interest, attorney fees and multiple damages.2'
II
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc
In the Markman trial, the plaintiff patent holder sued the defend-
ant for infringing on his patent for a dry cleaning inventory control
10. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
11. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent matters. 28 U.S.C. § 1338
(1988). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
matters. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. A patent claim is a document which precisely describes the invention for which the
inventor is seeking patent protection.
13. CHISUM, supra note 3, at 2-233.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2-251.
17. Id. at 2-233.
18. Id. at 2-252.
19. Id. at 2-255.
20. Id. at 2-251 to 2-289.
21. Id. at 2-289 to 2-305.
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system.22 The key to determining whether the defendant's system in-
fringed was the definition of "inventory" in the plaintiff's claim.23 The
defendant's system only tracked invoices and cash totals for his dry
cleaning business, 4 while the plaintiff's system tracked individual arti-
cles of clothing through the dry cleaning process.25 The plaintiff's pat-
ent claim stated that his system was designed to track "inventory. "26
The plaintiff argued that "inventory" meant invoices and cash totals,
and did not include "articles of clothing."27 The defendant countered
that "inventory" necessarily included clothing as well as invoices and
cash totals.28
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief, the defendant
moved for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).29 The trial court
deferred deciding the motion.30 At the conclusion of the trial, the
judge instructed the jury to determine: (1) the meaning of the claims,
and (2) whether the defendant's system infringed the plaintiff's pat-
ent.3 ' The jury found for the plaintiff.32 After the verdict, the judge
considered the defendant's JMOL motion.33 The judge ruled that "in-
ventory" included articles of clothing and not just invoices and cash
totals. 34 Because the defendant's system was incapable of tracking ar-
ticles of clothing, the judge directed a verdict in favor of the
defendant.35
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that it was proper for the
judge to interpret and construe plaintiff's patent claim to determine
the scope of his rights.36 The court stated that claim construction
should be based on: (1) the claim language itself, (2) the specifications
(which may be diagrams and accompanying text and descriptions),
and (3) the patent's prosecution history. In attempting to under-
22. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Penn.
1991), affd en banc, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995).
23. Id. at 1537.
24. Id. at 1538.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1536.
27. Id. at 1537.
28. Id. at 1538.





34. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536 (E.D. Penn.
1991), affid en banc, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995).
35. Id
36. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
37. Id.
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stand these sources for claim construction, a judge may also hear ex-
pert testimony and refer to learned treatises in the field.3 However,
the court cautioned that this extrinsic evidence can only be used as an
aid to understand the terms of the claim.39 Extrinsic evidence cannot
be used to vary or contradict the terms of the claim.4" The line be-
tween using extrinsic evidence as an aide for understanding and using
it to vary or contradict the claim is at best a fine line to draw.41
Prior to Markman, courts considered claim construction to be a
mixed question of law and fact. 2 In Perini America, Inc. v. Paper
Converting Machine Co. , the circuit court stated:
That a claim must be interpreted in a certain way is a conclusion of
law . ... Like all legal conclusions, that conclusion rises out of and
rests on a foundation built of established (undisputed or correctly
found) facts .... If the meaning of terms in the claim, the specifica-
tion, other claims, or prosecution history is disputed, that dispute
must be resolved as a question of fact before interpretation can
begin.44
Thus, according to Perini, the court can only interpret the claim if
there are no disputes about material facts which pertain to claim
construction.
Markman, however, suggests that claim construction is a pure
question of law:
Through this process of construing claims by... using extrinsic evi-
dence that the court finds helpful and rejecting other evidence as
unhelpful, and resolving disputes en route to pronouncing the
meaning of claim language as a matter of law based on the patent
documents themselves, the court is not crediting certain evidence
over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather,
the court is looking to extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction
of the written document, a task it is required to perform.45
Markman drastically altered the roles of the judge and jury in patent
infringement cases. Before Markman the jury would resolve any dis-
puted facts in the extrinsic evidence and the judge would rely upon
the jury's findings to construe the claim.46 Markman holds, however,
that even when the evidence is in dispute, the judge may interpret the
38. id.
39. Id. at 981.
40. Id.
41. CHiSUM, supra note 3, at 2-236 to 2-239.
42. Id. at 2-244.
43. 832 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
44. Id. at 584.
45. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
46. Perini, 832 F.2d at 583.
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claim and define the scope of the patent holder's rights without those
disputed facts being resolved by a jury. 7
III
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.
In Hilton Davis, the plaintiff alleged that the process which de-
fendant used to purify its food coloring infringed the same process
that plaintiff had patented.4" Defendant argued that its process was
not the same as the patented process.4 9 Plaintiff's patent claim stated
that the patented purification process took place in a range of 200 to
400 p.s.i.g. at a pH of 6.0 to 9.0.50 Defendant's process took place in a
range of 200 to 500 p.s.i.g. at a pH of 5.0.-'
The district court instructed the jury on the doctrine of
equivalents.52 The court stated that infringement could be found
under the doctrine of equivalents if the accused process performs
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
reach substantially the same result."53 The jury found that, under this
doctrine, defendant had infringed upon plaintiff's patent.54
In affirming the trial court,55 the circuit court addressed three
questions.5 6 First, "[d]oes a finding of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents require anything in addition to proof of the facts
that there are the same or substantially the same (a) function, (b) way,
and (c) result? '57 Next, "[i]s the issue of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents an equitable remedy to be decided by the court, or
is it, like literal infringement, an issue of fact to be submitted to the
jury in a jury case?"' 58 Finally, "[i]s the application of the doctrine of
equivalents by the trial court to find infringement of the patentee's
right to exclude, discretionary in accordance with the circumstances of
the case?"59
47. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1515.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1523.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1516.
55. Id. at 1528-29.






A. Are Additional Facts Required to Find Infringement Under the
Doctrine of Equivalents?
The circuit court stated that while the "function/way/means" test
is often enough to prove infringement, it "does not necessarily end the
inquiry," especially in cases involving high technology.6° There are
other factors which a court may instruct the jury to consider: first,
"whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known, of
the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent
with one that was;"'61 second, whether evidence of copying is present,
which would suggest that the changes that were made were insubstan-
tial;62 third, whether evidence of an attempt to "design around" a pat-
ent is present, which would suggest that substantial changes were
made to the accused device;63 and finally, whether the defendant inde-
pendently developed the accused device without knowledge of the
patented device64 (although this factor is only relevant to rebut an
allegation of copying).65
B. Is the Doctrine of Equivalents an Equitable Remedy to be Decided by
a Court?
Defendants argued that since the Federal Circuit had frequently
referred to the doctrine of equivalents as an equitable remedy,66 it
should be applied solely by a judge. 67 Alternatively, defendants ar-
gued that a jury should only be instructed on the doctrine of
equivalents when there is evidence of subjective intent to copy or pi-
rate a patented device.68 The court disagreed: "[T]he doctrine of
equivalents is not an equitable remedy available only on a showing of
the equities. Lack of awareness of the patent or its disclosure does
not excuse infringement. ' 69 Thus the court held that the doctrine of
equivalents is not limited to those situations where the plaintiff has
met an equitable threshold demonstrating that defendant acted in bad
faith.70
60. Id. at 1518.
61. Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1520.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1521.
67. Id. at 1523.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 1523.
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C. Does the Judge Have Discretion to Apply the Doctrine of Equivalents
in Accordance With the Circumstances of the Case?
The Federal Circuit held that the judge has no discretion to
choose whether to apply the doctrine of equivalents,71 and that every
patent holder is entitled to invoke the doctrine.72 Necessarily, this
means that few patent infringement cases will be resolved through
summary judgment. By simply pleading the doctrine of equivalents, a
patent holder virtually guarantees a full jury trial.
D. Hilton Davis Maintained or Increased the Power of the Jury
Prior to Hilton Davis the issue of whether the judge or jury ap-
plies the doctrine of equivalents was unclear. Although the Supreme
Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products
Co. 7 3 stated that the doctrine of equivalents was to be resolved as an
issue of fact, the Federal Circuit has characterized the doctrine as eq-
uitable.74 Thus, some cases emphasized that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is a factual question,7 5 while others empha-
sized the doctrine's equitable nature.76 As a factual question the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equivalents is for the jury; as an equitable
question, its application is for the judge. By concluding that the doc-
trine of equivalents presented an issue of fact for the jury, the Federal
Circuit maintained or increased the power of the jury in patent in-
fringement suits.
IV
Evaluating Whether Markman or Hilton Davis
Represents the Proper Policy Choice:
Should the Judge or Jury Decide?
The policies of Markman and Hilton Davis are in tension. While
Markman increases the power of judges to foster predictability in the
interpretation of a patent, Hilton Davis negates this power by allowing
a jury to supersede the judge's interpretation of the patent claim.
71. Id. at 1522.
72. Id.
73. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
74. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("This equitable doctrine evolved from a balancing of competing policies .... ").
75. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc) ("It is settled that the question of infringement (literal or by equivalents) is
factual.").
76. See Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir.
1992) ("[c]areful confinement of the doctrine of equivalents to its proper equitable role ...
promotes certainty and clarity in determining the scope of patent rights.").
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A. The Role of the Jury in Civil Trials: Deciding What Issues Should be
Determined by a Jury
In determining whether an issue should be decided by a judge or
jury, courts first look to the Constitution. The Seventh Amendment
states, "In suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved."77 This amendment was interpreted by Justice Story as re-
quiring a jury trial in matters where a jury trial would have been pro-
vided in England prior to 1791.78 Additionally, the Court has
interpreted this amendment as requiring a jury trial in statutory causes
of action analogous to common law actions. 79 As a result, the debate
about whether a particular jury practice is required by the Constitu-
tion typically involves an evaluation of cases from the 17th and 18th
centuries.8" Such an analysis is difficult for two reasons. First, the
court records of many of the old English cases are incomplete and
unreliable.81 Second, the age of the cases and societal differences
make a principled comparison extremely difficult.82 If it is unclear
whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury to consider a partic-
ular issue, courts should consider the institutional value of the jury
and whether a jury would be able to accurately decide the issue in
question.
In evaluating the institutional value of the jury, courts should rec-
ognize that the jury represents the conscience of the community.83
This legitimizes judicial decisions and enhances the public's apprecia-
tion of citizen participation in the decision-making process.84 As
Judge Higgenbotham observed, "This sense of participation is felt not
only by the jurors who actually participate in a particular trial, but also
extends to the members of the public whom the jurors represent. I
believe that the maintenance of public participation in the judicial
process is essential to continued popular acceptance of judicial deci-
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
78. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 746-50 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
79. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
80. See, e.g., Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A
Commentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1599 (1983) (arguing that there
was a complexity exception to the right to jury in England in cases dating back to the 17th
century); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 840-46 (1980) (responding to Devlin's article,
Arnold argues that the cases on which Devlin relies are too frail to support a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment).
81. Arnold, supra note 80, at 841.
82. Matsushita, 631 F.2d at 1083.
83. Steven I. Freidland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding
Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 206 (1990).
84. Patrick E. Higgenbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation
of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 58-59 (1977).
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sions. ''8 5 Structurally the jury also acts as a check upon the power of
the judge.86 The jury provides an important check in our system of
checks and balances. It strengthens the separation of powers by en-
suring that individual judges do not become the sole arbiters of all
disputes.87 As Professor Freidland stated, "according the jury a
greater voice during trial reallocates the division of power, providing a
symbolic and perhaps even an actual check on the court. The symbol-
ism of juror participation strengthens the conceptualization of the jury
as the representative of the people. 88
Of course, the institutional value of the jury is dependent upon its
ability to render accurate decisions. Accuracy is essential for two rea-
sons. First, the parties may have substantial monetary interests at
stake. 9 If the jury errs, parties will pay for wrongs they never com-
mitted.9" Second, accuracy maintains the legitimacy of the judicial
process.9 If jury decisions appear to be erroneous and irrational, par-
ties will lack confidence that their disputes will be justly and equitably
resolved. 2
B. Markman
In determining whether it is proper for the jury to resolve claims
construction issues, the court in Markman properly looked first to the
Constitution. The majority concluded that patent cases in 17th and
18th century England did not address the question of whether the
judge or the jury was to construe the patent claim:93
Any constitutional concerns raised by this opinion must be limited
to the issue of claim construction. It is significant that neither the
dissenting nor the concurring opinions cite any cases supporting the
proposition that claim construction was a question of fact or in-
volved triable issues of fact in or prior to 1791 .... The search for
such a case may well be a fruitless one because of the manifest dif-
ferences in patent law in eighteenth century England and patent law
as it exists today in Title 35 of the United States Code.9
The dissent disagreed. It argued that it was clear patent claim con-
struction and the determination of infringement were issues for the
85. Id. at 59.
86. Freidland, supra note 83, at 207.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 207-08.
89. Id at 194.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 195.
92. Id.
93. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
94. Id. at 984 (citations omitted).
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jury in 17th and 18th century England. 5 The dissent concluded, "On
this history it is jarring to come upon the majority's argument that the
Seventh Amendment no longer applies because there are now 'claims'
in United States patents, whereas the old English patent system did
not have claims as we know them."96
It is unclear whether the dissent or the majority is correct. The
differences in technology and patent procedures make comparison be-
tween modem American and 17th and 18th century English patent
cases nearly impossible. Recognizing this, the majority focused in-
stead on the policies to be served by taking claims construction issues
away from the jury.
The Markman decision was intended to foster predictability in
patent litigation. Predictability is extremely important because uncer-
tainty may frustrate the fundamental policies patent protection is sup-
posed to serve. Patent protection represents a compromise between
providing an incentive for inventors to invest their time and money in
developing new technology, while ensuring the free flow of informa-
tion to foster further technological advancement.97 This compromise
is struck by rewarding the inventor with a limited term monopoly over
the right to make, use, or sell the invention. However, to receive this
right, the patentee must publicly disclose the specifications of the in-
vention.98 Full disclosure provides others with a clue to further tech-
nological advances and, after the patent expires, allows others to
reproduce the invention.99 Uncertainty may frustrate this compro-
mise. As Judge Michel' ° explained:
If an invention's patentability is uncertain, individual and corporate
inventors alike may elect not to disclose it in a patent application
that, under present law, becomes public upon allowance. Instead,
they may decide to maintain it as a trade secret. Similarly, if the
sustainability of a patent is uncertain, the incentive to file is dimin-
ished, if not eliminated. 1° 1
With little incentive to file a patent claim, many inventors may choose
to forego the high costs of prosecuting a patent. As a result, the pub-
lic will lose the benefits of public disclosure and further technological
95. Id. at 1011.
96. Id at 1016.
97. See CHISUM, supra note 3, at 1-2.
98. Id.
99. See Judge Paul R. Michel, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Introduction, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1231, 1241 (1994).
100. Judge Michel currently sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. He was in the majority in Markman and Hilton Davis.
101. Michel, supra note 99, at 1241.
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advancement. 10 2 Furthermore, if the uncertainties are too high, cor-
porations may choose not to fund the research and development of
new technologies.10 3 In either case, the policies which our patent sys-
tem was developed to foster would be frustrated, and society would
lose the benefits of new technology.
The majority in Markman reasoned that requiring a judge to in-
terpret the terms of a patent, and therefore the scope of the patentee's
rights, served the policies behind the Patent Act more effectively than
leaving interpretation to the jury. Reasoning that judicial interpreta-
tion would foster predictability, the majority in Markman explained:
[Competitors] may understand what is the scope of the patent
owner's rights by obtaining the patent and prosecution history-
"the undisputed public record"-and applying established rules of
construction to the language of the patent claim in the context of
the patent. Moreover, competitors should be rest assured, if in-
fringement litigation occurs, that a judge, trained in the law, will
similarly analyze the text of the patent and its associated public rec-
ord and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way
arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner's rights
to be given legal effect.1°4
Markman implies that only a judge can apply "the established rules of
construction.' ' 0 5 Necessarily, the majority also implies that a jury
would be unable to apply those rules to arrive at a proper construction
of a patent claim. This means that the court in Markman found that
the jury's inability to accurately decide claim construction issues
would override the jury's institutional value.
If it is true that juries are unable to render principled and predict-
able decisions, then the Markman court properly removed the claims
construction issue from the jury. The jury's institutional value is only
present when it is able to render accurate decisions. 10 6 However, if
jurors can render principled and predictable decisions, then the court
should have preserved or increased the role of the jury' as it did in
Hilton Davis. As an accurate decision-maker, the jury also brings in-
stitutional legitimacy to patent infringement trials. 10 7 The key to ju-
rors' ability to render principled decisions is their ability to
comprehend the issues raised in a patent infringement trial, and to
properly apply the judge's instructions. If jurors can accomplish these
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
105. See id. at 979.
106. See Freidland, supra note 83, at 207.
107. See id.
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tasks, then they should be able to render a principled and predictable
verdict.
C. Support for the Policies Served by Markman-the Complexity
Exception to the Seventh Amendment & Juror
Comprehension
1. The Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment
There may be good reason to believe that jurors render unprinci-
pled and unpredictable decisions due to lack of comprehension.
Twenty years ago a debate raged about whether juries were compe-
tent to reach principled decisions in complex antitrust litigation. °8
The debate began with footnote ten in Ross v. Bernhard.°9 In Ross,
the Court stated a tripartite test for determining whether a party is
entitled to a jury trial. The factors were, "first, the pre-merger custom
with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and
third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries."' 0
This footnote led one court to develop a "complexity exception"
to the Seventh Amendment."' The court in In re Japanese Electronic
Products Antitrust Litigation provided the rationale for its newly de-
veloped "complexity exception." In describing the shortcomings of
juries the court stated:
The long time periods ... are especially disabling for a jury.
Furthermore, a jury is likely to be unfamiliar with both the technical
subject matter of a complex case and the process of civil litigation.
The probability is not remote that a jury will become overwhelmed
and confused by a mass of evidence and issues and will reach erro-
neous decisions. The reality of these difficulties that juries encoun-
ter in complex cases is underscored by the experience of some
federal district judges who have found particular suits to have ex-
ceeded the practical abilities of the jury. 12
The court then explained why a judge would be able to render a
more principled decision than a jury in a complex antitrust suit:
A long trial would not greatly disrupt the professional and personal
life of a judge and should not be significantly disabling. In fact, thejudge's greater ability to allocate time to the task of deciding a com-
plex case can be a major advantage in surmounting the difficulties
posed by the suit .... [A judge's experience in civil litigation] can
enable him to digest a large amount of evidence and legal argument,
segregate distinct issues and the portions of evidence relevant to
108. See RICHARD MARCUS, COMPLEX LITIGATION 852-53 (1992).
109. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
110. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
111. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 1086.
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each issue, assess the opinions of expert witnesses, and apply highly
complex legal standards to the facts of the case.11 3
The court concluded that when a case is beyond the "practical
abilities of a jury," and an unprincipled jury verdict is likely to result,
due process requires a court to strike the jury demand.114 Thus, the
court held that complex antitrust suits should be tried by the court and
not a jury.115
Other courts did not follow the invitation to find a "complexity
exception" to the Seventh Amendment.'16 The Ninth Circuit stated
that the complexity of a case is no reason to strike a rightful jury de-
mand. 117 Instead, the court recommended that the parties' lawyers
and the court itself should make an extra effort to organize and pres-
ent the material in a form "which is understandable to the
uninitiated."118
2. Studies on Juror Comprehension in Complex Cases
In response to cases such as Japanese Electronics and U.S. Finan-
cial Securities, many studies have been conducted on juror compre-
hension in complex cases. The Federal Judicial Center conducted the
first comprehensive study.' 19 This study examined how jurors per-
formed in lengthy civil trials.'20 The researchers surveyed jurors from
twenty-nine trials each lasting more than twenty days.121 The survey
results obtained from these jurors were compared to the results ob-
tained from jurors who participated in trials lasting less than twenty
days. Forty-six percent of jurors from the longer trials stated that the
evidence was difficult or very difficult. 122 Twenty-nine percent of the
jurors from the shorter trials stated that the evidence was difficult or
very difficult.1 23 However, even in the longer trials, a majority of the
jurors reported that the evidence was within their comprehension.124
These results indicate, at least from the juror's perspective, that the
113. Id. at 1087.
114. Id. at 1088.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
117. Id. at 432.
118. Id. at 427.
119. Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
727, 750 (1991).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 751.




length of the trial does not render the jurors unable to make a rational
decision.
The American Bar Association (ABA) conducted another
study.125 The ABA Report consisted of an in depth examination of
jury decision-making in four complex cases.' 26 The subjects of these
cases were antitrust, sexual harassment, misappropriation of trade
secrets, and insurance fraud.127 The researchers interviewed and gave
surveys to the jurors in each case to assess their comprehension of the
issues raised at trial.'2 8 The volume of evidence presented to the ju-
rors in each of these cases had some impact on juror comprehension,
but did not seem to be a controlling factor.'2 9 Instead, the jurors'
prior familiarity with the issues in each of the cases seemed to-control
their comprehension of the evidence. For example, despite the large
volume of evidence in the sexual harassment case, the jurors stated
that they had no difficulty understanding the interpersonal relation-
ships involved. 13° However, in the trade secret case, jurors expressed
great difficulty in comprehending the issues involved.' 31
A second case study found that jurors in asbestos cases misunder-
stood the medical evidence.1 32 Another case study found that while
jurors understood the primary facts involved in an antitrust suit, they
had great difficulty understanding the economic concepts and techni-
cal legal standards necessary to apply to those facts.133
These studies indicate that the length of the trial does not have as
much impact on jurors' comprehension of the issues as does the na-
ture of the issues. Specifically, scientific and technical issues seem to
cause the greatest trouble for jurors.
These findings are especially relevant in the patent litigation area.
Jurors are not only required to gain an understanding of complex sci-
entific data, as in the trade secret and asbestos cases, but are required
to apply technical legal standards, as in the antitrust cases. Thus, the
studies indicate that jurors are very likely to misunderstand the issues
raised during a patent infringement case.
125. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES: AN
ABA SATELLITE SEMINAR (March 22, 1990) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
126. Id. at 9.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7, 8.
129. Id. at 26.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cecil et al., supra note 119, at 755.
133. Id.
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D. Support for the Policies Served by Hilton Davis: Taking Power Away
from the Jury May Not be the Way to Increase Predictability
There are several reasons to doubt that Markman will actually
increase, predictability. First, Markman assumes that judges will be
better able to interpret claims than juries. One must question if this is
actually the case. While the Federal Circuit has special expertise in
patent cases, the typical district court judge does not. Senior U.S. Dis-
trict Judge William Ingram, who has presided in nearly twenty patent
trials, doubts that judges can interpret claims more accurately than
juries. He stated, "I think it's nafve to believe that judges, who have
spent most of their time doing something other than engineering, are
ever going to be able to understand that .... I think we're all in the
same boat." '134 At best it is unclear whether judges can interpret pat-
ent claims more accurately than juries.
Second, even the claim that Markman could increase predictabil-
ity by reducing the number of issues that a jury needs to consider dur-
ing the trial is questionable. As Charlene M. Morrow, an intellectual
property partner at Fenwick & West, explains:
Markman does not preclude a trial judge from deferring the claim
construction issue until trial. In cases where the judge determines
that the invention is complex, and that he needs to hear a lengthy
tutorial on the subject matter, he may not wish to duplicate the ef-
fort involved by having the tutorial given a second time for the
jury. 135
Thus, when a judge defers the claim construction issues, the jury
must still hear all of the scientific evidence related to claim construc-
tion. The number of issues on which a jury must hear evidence is not
reduced, and the jury's burden to understand the evidence presented
during trial is not lightened under Markman in cases when the judge
defers the patent construction issue until the end of the trial.
Finally, Markman may increase predictability by simplifying jury
deliberations and the legal rules that the jury must apply. Before
Markman, jurors had to perform three steps: first, they had to perform
a complicated legal analysis to construe the patent claim; then, they
had to decide whether there was literal infringement; last, if there was
no literal infringement, then they may have had to determine whether
there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Markman
134. Mark Walsh, Subject to Interpretation, THE RECORDER, May 18, 1995, at 1.
135. Charlene M. Morrow, Trying Patent Infringement Claims after Markman and
Hilton Davis, FENWICK & WEST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BULLETIN (Fenwick & West,
Palo Alto, CA), Fall 1995, at 7.
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implicitly found that forcing the jury to perform all of these compli-
cated tasks may have exceeded the abilities of lay people.136
Removing the first step in the analysis from the jurors' responsi-
bility could arguably have two effects. First, since there will be fewer
issues for the jury to consider, the jury will be presented with less
scientific evidence and will not have to hear as many expert witnesses.
This may help to reduce confusion and increase comprehension. Sec-
ond, since the judge will construe the patent claim, the jury will re-
ceive more guidance in deciding the infringement issue. 137 With
additional guidance, the chances that the jurors will misapply the legal
standards will be reduced.
However, taking the claims construction issues away from the
jury is an extreme reaction or panacea. The Markman court should
have considered the benefits of improved trial techniques to give the
jury more guidance in their deliberations and increase jury compre-
hension. With more guidance and increased comprehension, jurors
may be able to fulfill their role as accurate decision-makers. As accu-
rate decision-makers, the juries will provide institutional benefits 38 as
well as the predictability in results Markman attempts to foster. These
improved trial techniques include: bifurcating claims construction and
infringement issues, allowing jurors to take notes, providing written
instructions, allowing juror questions, providing neutral experts, giv-
ing pretrial instructions, and using "blue ribbon" or expert juries.
1. Improved Trial Techniques to Increase Juror Comprehension and
Increase Predictability in Jury Verdicts
a. Bifurcation
Bifurcation is the separation of legal issues in a trial into two sep-
arate proceedings. 39 In patent infringement cases, claims construc-
tion issues could be heard and decided by one jury in one proceeding,
while infringement issues could be heard and decided by another jury
in another proceeding. Separation of issues in a trial compartmental-
izes the issues, facilitating juror understanding. 4 °
In a patent infringement case, bifurcation may increase predict-
ability. While Markman may arguably increase predictability to the
extent that jury deliberations are simplified and juror comprehension
is increased, bifurcation also simplifies the task of the jury. Bifurca-
136. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
137. Michel, supra note 99, at 1235.
138. See discussion supra pp. 640-41.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
140. In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988).
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tion, however, does not remove claim construction issues from the
jury; instead, it simply limits the jury's consideration to one issue at a
time. By limiting the number of issues that the jury must consider at
the same time, bifurcation may increase juror comprehension thereby
ensuring that jurors will be able to perform their role as accurate deci-
sion-makers. Thus, bifurcation may increase predictability to the
same extent as Markman without compromising the jury's institu-
tional benefits.
However, bifurcation does have problems. First, issues often can-
not be cleanly separated. 4' Additionally, even if the issues can be
cleanly separated, some scholars have suggested that jurors need to
hear the entire story during trial. 42 If issues are separated, jurors may
be less effective in coming to a principled decision.'43 However, if a
judge resolves the claim construction issues before trial, the same
problems exist with the Markman procedure as with bifurcation.
Under Markman, the jury will still only hear one phase of the trial.
Whether the first phase is resolved by a judge or another jury is
irrelevant.
A more serious problem with bifurcation is that holding two sep-
arate trials may strain judicial resources. The effort required to edu-
cate one jury in the relevant technical area already takes a lot of time
and energy. Educating two juries may create such a burden as to out-
weigh the benefits of bifurcation.
b. Juror Note Taking
Students take notes in school in order to remember the issues
discussed in class. Yet some judges require jurors to hear a trial with-
out the benefit of a notebook.'" Allowing jurors to take notes in pat-
ent cases may facilitate the jurors' understanding of the issues by
helping jurors to focus on the proceedings.' 45
Some judges, however, express concerns about letting jurors take
notes. 146 The main concern is that good note takers will unduly domi-
nate deliberations. 47 Other judges, attorneys, and jurors contest this
141. See Symbolic Control, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 643 F.2d 1339
(9th Cir. 1980) (court reversed the district court because there was too much overlap be-
tween the issues which the court attempted to separate).
142. Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Litigation: The Impact of
Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989).
143. Id.
144. William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 591 (1991).
145. See Cecil et al., supra note 119, at 769.
146. United States v. Maclean, 578 F.2d 64, 66 (3rd Cir. 1978).
147. Id.
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concern.148 Juror studies indicate that note taking facilitates an under-
standing of the issues without the ill effects feared by its opponents. 149
In the ABA Report, 55% of the jurors surveyed said that note taking
helped keep their minds on the evidence.' 50 Additionally, there was
no evidence that note takers dominated deliberations. 151 Since in-
creased understanding increases predictability, and no ill effects have
been demonstrated, jurors should be allowed to take notes during pat-
ent infringement trials.
c. Written Instructions
Written final instructions to a jury may provide much guidance to
the jury during their deliberations. In a patent infringement case writ-
ing comprehensive instructions may be difficult, but the written in-
struction could prove to be an essential tool to remind the jury of the
issues they are expected to resolve.' 52 "Judges and attorneys who
have had experience with written instructions have expressed satisfac-
tion.' 1 53 However, there are some potential problems. First, jurors
may not read certain clauses in context and may place too much
weight on one segment of the instructions. 54 For example, a jury ap-
plying the doctrine of equivalents could place too much weight on the
fact that the accused invention performs the same function as the pat-
ented invention, without considering the other factors. Second, be-
cause jurors have the instructions before them, jurors may be too
embarrassed to ask clarifying questions. 5 However, these concerns
seem minor, and empirical evidence shows that jurors uniformly find
written instructions to be very helpful.' 56 Additionally, it is difficult to
see how the perceived problems with written instructions are not
equally present with oral instructions. Thus, jurors should be given
written instructions in patent infringement trials.
d. Juror Questions
Another method of improving juror understanding is to allow the
jurors to ask questions of expert witnesses. This would be helpful be-
148. Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted
by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 451-52 (1985).
149. ABA REPORT, supra note 125, at 35.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 36.
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cause an expert may overlook information that the jurors believe is
crucial to making a decision.'57 Although jurors were not allowed to
ask questions in any of the case studies contained in the ABA Report,
one juror thought it would have improved her ability to comprehend
witness testimony.158 In a patent case, there might be one aspect of
the technology which the jurors do not quite understand. Allowing
them to ask questions would ensure that their lack of understanding is
addressed.
The problem with this technique is that jurors may feel snubbed if
an attorney objects to one of their questions. Lempert suggests a
method which would help to avoid this problem: allow the jury to sub-
mit written questions to the judge after the parties are finished exam-
ining a witness.' 59 The judge could then screen out inadmissible
questions outside the presence of the jury, 6 ' asking only admissible
questions.' 6 '
In addition to increasing understanding, allowing questions in-
creases juror involvement and may increase juror focus during lengthy
trials.' 62 Also, the parties and the judge can gauge how well a jury is
comprehending the issues by the questions they ask.' 63 If there ap-
pears to be an area with which the jury is having special difficulty, the
judge can use jury control mechanisms more aggressively. 164 For ex-
ample, a judge could direct parties to clarify certain issues with which
the jury is having trouble. 65
As with the other suggestions, there are problems with allowing
juror questions. First, "jurors may give disproportionate weight to the
evidence which [answers] their questions.' 66 Next, juror questions
may add trial time to patent cases which are already quite long.' 67
Finally, juror questions may take control of the case away from the
parties.' 68 However, these problems are speculative. Any measure
which may increase juror comprehension without unduly prejudicing
157. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment,
80 Micii. L. REV. 68, 123 (1981).
158. ABA REPORT, supra note 125, at 39.
159. Lempert, supra note 157, at 123.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the parties should at least be attempted before taking patent claim
construction issues away from the jury.
e. Neutral Experts
Difficult concepts of engineering and biology, which form the
background of many of the most complex patent infringement trials,
are not easily understood in the traditional question-answer proce-
dure of a trial.169 Instead, an agreed upon expert could present a tuto-
rial on basic noncontroversial concepts to both the judge and the
jury. 70
Lempert criticized this suggested improvement:
This reform is undoubtedly oversold. It shares the lay assumption
that the scientific implications of evidence are likely to be unequivo-
cal, and implies that the primary reason that parties' witnesses disa-
gree is that they are paid to espouse different positions....
A judicially appointed expert may be neutral in the sense that
he owes his salary to neither party, but he may have a strong alle-
giance to a particular theoretical perspective or to a way of reading
equivocal evidence.
17 1
While it is true that much debate about scientific and engineering
principles exists at higher levels, there is a good deal of non-contro-
versial information that can provide jurors with the background neces-
sary to understand the more sophisticated issues presented during
trial. For example, in electrical engineering, most experts agree on
how semiconductors work. In biology, most experts agree on the
manner in which cells reproduce. There may be disputes about the
intricacies of how one semiconductor is different from another, or why
one type of cell reproduces differently than another, but there is
agreement on the basic concepts. A neutral expert could do much to
increase juror comprehension, and in turn, predictability of results.
Thus, neutral experts should be used in patent infringement suits.
f. Pretrial Instruction
Jurors have difficulty applying complex legal doctrines to the
facts of a case.' 72 One solution is to instruct the jurors on the law
before evidence is presented to them.' 73 Early instruction provides
jurors with a mental structure into which they can fit evidence as it is
presented during trial.' 74 In a patent infringement case, jurors should
169. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 588 (1991).
170. Id. at 589.
171. Lempert, supra note 157, at 124-25.
172. ABA REPoRT, supra note 125, at 43.
173. Id. at 49.
174. Id.
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be instructed at the pretrial phase on claims construction, literal in-
fringement, and the doctrine of equivalents. Receiving these instruc-
tions in the pretrial phase would allow jurors to understand the
significance of the evidence as it is presented. According to the ABA
Report, 67% of the jurors who received pretrial instructions said that
the early instructions helped them weigh the evidence. 175
One problem with early instruction is that it may cause jurors to
prejudge a case.176 Another problem is that as issues change, evi-
dence that was once marginally relevant becomes critical. If jurors
focus only on evidence clearly relevant to the early instructions, they
may miss critical evidence which becomes important as the case devel-
ops. Yet, while these problems may exist hypothetically, they have
not materialized in any studies conducted on early instruction.177
Since early instruction increases, juror comprehension and has no
demonstrated negative effects, it should be used in patent infringe-
ment cases.
g. Expert or Blue Ribbon Juries
Superficially, having a jury composed of experts in the relevant
field seems to be the best solution to the problem of juror comprehen-
sion. As experts, jurors on a blue ribbon jury would come to the
courtroom with the knowledge required to understand the evidence
presented to them. No time would be wasted educating jurors. Since
they would comprehend the technical issues, expert jurors would
probably render more predictable verdicts than either a lay judge or
jury.
However there are some significant problems with using an ex-
pert jury. First, as professionals in the relevant field, they may have
their own technical theories which may bias their opinions.178 These
biases may prevent an impartial verdict.' 79 In contrast, a lay jury
brings a fresh perspective, untainted by previous knowledge of the rel-
evant field. 180 While this lack of knowledge may be somewhat of a
handicap, it also serves to ensure that an impartial verdict is
reached. 18 ' A related problem is that a jury of professionals would
175. Id. at 50.
176. Lempert, supra note 157, at 122.
177. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment
with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 409 (1989).
178. John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25






not represent the conscience of the general community. Instead it
would represent a very narrow band of our society. As a result, much
of the institutional benefits provided by a jury would be lost. Finally,
it may be practically impossible to find twelve professionals who
would be willing to sit on a jury during a lengthy patent trial. If a lay
jury can be sufficiently educated to comprehend most of the issues,
then the benefits of using an expert jury will be reduced, and these
problems will weigh heavily against the use of an expert jury. Use of
expert juries should only be considered if educating a lay jury proves
to be unsuccessful.
2. What Markman Should Have Done and What the Supreme Court
Should Do
Markman should have considered the potential effects of these
trial techniques on juror comprehension and predictability before de-
priving the jury of the claims construction issue. If these techniques
increase juror comprehension, then jurors will be able to'fulfill their
role as accurate decision-makers. As accurate decision-makers, jurors
provide institutional benefits that are not present when a judge de-
cides an issue. The most appropriate techniques for patent infringe-
ment suit include: allowing jurors to take notes, the use of written
instructions, allowing jurors to question expert witnesses, the use of
neutral experts to provide tutorials in the relevant fields, and the use
of pretrial instructions. Some of these techniques have problems, but
the benefits in aiding juror comprehension and predictability out-
weigh any burdens they may present. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to hear Markman and Hilton Davis.182 Hopefully, the Court
will recognize the value of the jury by reversing the Federal Circuit's
Markman decision and affirming the Hilton Davis decision.
V
Conclusion
Juries provide institutional benefits which are not present when
judges decide issues, but studies indicate that jurors are likely to not
comprehend many of the issues raised in patent infringement trials.
Thus, one can understand why Markman and Hilton Davis are in ten-
sion. It appears that the Federal Circuit may have recognized the con-
flicting policies and decided to make a compromise. Whether the
182. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Penn. 1991),
affd, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995); Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014
(1996).
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court struck a proper balance depends on whether leaving claims con-
struction to the judge will actually increase predictability to such an
extent that reducing the jury's role is justified.
Markman went too far, too quickly, when it wrenched claims con-
struction issues from the hands of the jury. The Federal Circuit should
have considered the various methods of improving juror comprehen-
sion before deciding that juries are incapable of rendering predictable
decisions. Only after trying at least some of the techniques discussed
in this Note and finding no improvement in results would the court
have been justified in limiting the role of the jury to the extent it did in
Markman.

